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Joshua E. Kastenberg 
Sufficiently Judicial: The Need for a Universal Ethics Rule on 
Attorney Behavior in Legislative Impeachment Trials 
Abstract.  In assessing an ethics, rule-based prohibition against New Jersey 
governmental attorneys representing clients against the state for matters the 
state had previously assigned to them, the state supreme court noted: “In our 
representative form of government, it is essential that the conduct of public 
officials and employees shall hold the respect and confidence of the people.”*
In the beginning of 2020, the United States Senate held an impeachment 
trial to determine whether former President Donald J. Trump had committed 
offenses forwarded by the House of Representatives.  A U.S. Senate trial, much 
like state senate trials, is both judicial and political in nature.   
Several senators and hundreds of state legislators are licensed attorneys.  The 
rules of professional responsibility place great emphasis on attorneys complying 
with their oath of office.  Such oaths, and the accompanying rules of decorum, 
apply to all judicial proceedings.  However, during President Trump’s U.S. 
Senate trial, at least two senators who are licensed attorneys openly promised 
they would not be impartial.  Additionally, the impartial jury mandate precluded 
other senators from serving on a normal trial jury due to their previous 
comments, but that mandate was not applied in this case.  This Article explores 
how legislative duties for lawyers intersect with professional obligations under 
the attorney ethics rules, and how the conduct of legislators who are admitted 
to the bar may undermine the legal profession.  The Article also proposes a 
 




draft ethics rule to apply to legislators who serve in judicial and quasi-judicial 
capacities that mandate compliance with oaths of office while simultaneously 
allowing participation in the legislative duties expected of an elected official. 
Author.  Prior to joining The University of New Mexico School of Law 
faculty, Professor Joshua Kastenberg had a twenty-year career as a lawyer and 
judge in the U.S. Air Force.  He served as an advisor to the Department of 
Defense on cyber security and cyber warfare matters, twice deployed to Iraq, 
and oversaw the military’s compliance with international law.  In addition, he 
served as a prosecutor and defense counsel in over 200 trials and as a judge in 
over 200 trials.   
Professor Kastenberg has been cited by The Washington Post, has appeared on 
Fox News, and has written over a dozen law review articles as well as four 
books.  Prior to joining the faculty at The University of New Mexico School of 
Law, he taught graduate and undergraduate level courses in national security 
law and systems as well as legal history.  Professor Kastenberg’s interests are in 
the fields of criminal law and procedure, evidence, legal history, and judicial 
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PROPOSED RULE: In any legislative proceeding in which a member of 
the bar is required to take a juror oath or if the proceeding is partially judicial 
in nature, the failure to uphold the duty of impartial justice or to refuse the 
oath shall be considered a breach of the norms of attorney conduct.  The 
term “judicial” denotes all proceedings in which an oath of impartiality is 
administered to legislators or jurors.  Nothing in this rule requires a legislator 
in such proceedings to recuse themselves from a proceeding because of 
political party affiliation, race, gender, religion, national origin, or sexual 
orientation. 
A lawyer has often been called an “officer of the court” and is therefore 
subject to ethical standards not applicable to general society.1  Concededly, 
the “officer of the court” concept has a checkered history in keeping 
applicants from entering the bar based on race, gender, citizenship status, 
religious affiliation, or political ideology.2  Despite this history, the “officer 
of the court” concept remains important to the governance of the legal 
profession, as it promotes public confidence in the law.3  This concept 
applies to all licensed attorneys, including those elected to Congress.  
However, legislators enjoy legal immunity for conduct occurring within a 
legislative function.4  But, as noted throughout this Article, there is no 
 
1. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1071–72 (1991) (stating during judicial 
proceedings attorneys’ rights to free speech are “extremely circumscribed,” and later referring to a 
lawyer as “an ‘officer of the court’”); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 174 (1986) (stating lawyers are 
officers of the court and key components of the justice system); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 
(1947) (referring to lawyers as officers of the court); Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 
(11th Cir. 1994) (“Every lawyer is an officer of the court.”); see also E.W. Timberlake, Jr., The Lawyer as 
an Officer of the Court, 11 VA. L. REV. 263, 263 (1924–25) (describing the role of an attorney as an officer 
of the court and oaths attorneys were bound by). 
2. See In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 562 (1945) (discussing exclusion based on conscientious 
objection to military service in war and mentioning the importance of the issue in regard to civil rights); 
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 131 (1872) (discussing exclusion on the basis of gender); In re Chang, 
60 Cal. 4th 1169, 1169–70 (Cal. 2015) (discussing how a Chinese man was excluded from the California 
bar due to the Chinese Exclusion Act); Joshua E. Kastenberg, Hugo Black’s Vision of the Lawyer, the First 
Amendment, and the Duty of the Judiciary: The Bar Applicant Cases in a National Security State, 20 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 691, 748 (2012) (discussing an implied exclusion from the bar based on a disfavored 
political ideology). 
3. See In re Gordon, 429 N.E.2d 1150, 1150–52 (Mass. 1982) (discussing an individual who was 
disbarred because of convictions of larceny and conspiracy and that if he were reinstated to the bar it 
“would diminish public confidence in the courts and the bar”). 
4.  See, e.g., Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 52 (1998) (citing Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 
367, 376 (1951)) (noting an absolute immunity for legislators existing under statute is supported by 
both history and reason). 
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protection from bar discipline while serving as a legislator; certainly, lawyers 
who disrupt judicial or administrative proceedings can face swift and 
substantial consequences.5  Most recently, the conduct of two law school-
educated, bar-admitted senators during the Senate impeachment trial of 
former President Donald Trump highlights the need for a rule of ethics 
tailored to legislators who serve on impeachment trials in the federal or state 
legislatures. 
 On December 14, 2019, Senator Lindsey Graham informed CNN News 
that he intended not to be a fair and impartial juror in the pending 
impeachment trial of President Trump.6  Senator Graham graduated from 
the University of South Carolina School of Law and began his legal career 
as a military officer in the United States Air Force, Judge Advocate General’s 
Corps.7  After leaving active duty in 1989, he joined the South Carolina Air 
National Guard and later the Air Force Reserves in 1995.8  Graham also 
served as a military judge on the United States Air Force Court of Criminal 
Appeals, but was disqualified from judicial service after a higher appellate 
court found his senatorial position incompatible with judicial assignments.9  
During the impeachment trial, Graham excused himself from the Senate 
floor when the House managers presented evidence showing 
Senator Graham’s own impeachment standards, which he articulated during 
the impeachment of President Clinton.10   
 
5. See Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 11 (1952) (establishing the grounds where a judge  
may impose punishment for contempt during a trial); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 533–34 
(1925) (indicating an attorney’s disparaging comments directed at a judge may result in the attorney 
being held in contempt); In re Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 302–03 (1888) (discussing courts’ ability to punish 
disruptions through the contempt power). 
6. Veronica Stracqualursi, ‘I’m Not Trying to Pretend to Be a Fair Juror Here’: Graham Predicts Trump 
Impeachment Will ‘Die Quickly’ in Senate, CNN POL. (Dec. 14, 2019, 2:48 PM), https://www.cnn.com/ 
2019/12/14/politics/lindsey-graham-trump-impeachment-trial/index.html [https://perma.cc/JPZ4-
9L48]. 
7. See Biography, U.S. SENATOR SOUTH CAROLINA LINDSEY GRAHAM, https://www. 
lgraham.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/biography [https://perma.cc/4VL7-G5ZU] (“Graham 
compiled a distinguished record in the United States Air Force as he logged six-and-a-half years of 
service on active duty as an Air Force lawyer.”). 
8. Id.  
9. See generally 10 U.S.C. § 866 (2019) (describing the role of a military Court of Criminal Appeals 
and its jurisdictional limits as well as its differing authority to hear certain cases on appeal from courts-
martial).  On Graham’s disqualification, see United States v. Lane, 64 M.J. 1, 2, 7 (C.A.A.F. 2006). 
10. See Bart Jansen & Nicholas Wu, Democrats Use Lindsey Graham’s Clinton Impeachment Speech in 
Trump Senate Trial, USA TODAY (Jan. 23, 2020, 3:47 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/news/politics/2020/01/23/impeachment-trial-nadler-plays-clinton-trial-video-lindsey-graham 
/4555925002 [https://perma.cc/QDD6-3BUD] (reporting comments Senator Graham made on what 
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Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell graduated from the University 
of Kentucky College of Law, and briefly worked in the United States 
Department of Justice before pursuing his political career.11  Notably, 
McConnell also once served in a quasi-judicial capacity at the county level.12  
Regardless, prior to the 2020 impeachment trial, he disavowed any intention 
of being an impartial juror and admitted he intended to coordinate with the 
White House.13   
Prior to President Trump’s first U.S. Senate impeachment trial, 
Chief Justice John Roberts administered an oath that called for a promise of 
impartiality, which both Senator Graham and Senator McConnell 
accepted.14  Despite taking this oath, Senators McConnell and Graham 
never explained nor distanced themselves from their earlier statements.  
Additionally, other senators spent parts of the impeachment trial playing 
with fidget spinners, stress balls, and displaying conduct clearly evidencing 
a determination not to consider any evidence or arguments.15 
Whatever the country might take from the conduct of elected legislators 
who decide not to comport with an oath administered by a judge or justice, 
the legislators who have been admitted to practice law undermine legal 
professionalism by flouting the duty demanded by this oath.  Flouting the 
oath cannot boost the public’s confidence in the law.  Thus, a rule of 
accountability specific to the legislative process, as suggested above, should 
 
he felt was a “high crime”); Paul LeBlanc, Democrats Play 1999 Video of Lindsey Graham Talking About 
Impeachment to Bolster Case Against Trump, CNN POL. (Jan. 23, 2020 5:44 PM), https://www.cnn. 
com/2020/01/23/politics/impeachment-managers-lindsey-graham-video/index.html [https://per 
ma.cc/LST2-JDBJ] (stating Senator Graham was absent from the Senate floor when Democrats played 
a 1999 video of him during the impeachment of President Bill Clinton). 
11. About Mitch McConnell, MITCH MCCONNELL REPUBLICAN LEADER, https://www. 
republicanleader.senate.gov/about [https://perma.cc/7FTV-S8ZE]. 
12. See id. (“[McConnell] served as judge-executive of Jefferson County, Kentucky . . . .”); 
see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 67.710 (West 2020) (describing the duties of a county judge-executive). 
13. See Alexander Bolton, McConnell on Impeachment: ‘I’m Not Impartial About This at All’, HILL 
(Dec. 17, 2019, 2:53 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/474946-mcconnell-on-impeach 
ment-im-not-impartial-about-this-at-all [https://perma.cc/6SFL-AT3U] (reporting a statement by 
Senator McConnell: “I’m not an impartial juror”). 
14. See, e.g., Rebecca Shabad et al., Chief Justice John Roberts Swears in Senators for Trump’s 
Impeachment Trial, NBC NEWS (Jan. 16, 2020, 10:54 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/ 
politics/trump-impeachment-inquiry/house-managers-head-senate-present-read-articles-impeachmen 
t-trial-n1117001 [https://perma.cc/59J6-Y9RM] (reporting Chief Justice Roberts “asked the senators 
to ‘solemnly swear’ to ‘do impartial justice’”). 
15. See, e.g., Justine Coleman, GOP Senator Provides Fidget Spinners to Senate Colleagues at Lunch, 
HILL (Jan. 23, 2020, 1:44 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/479595-gop-senator-prov 
ides-fidget-spinners-to-senate-colleagues-at-lunch [https://perma.cc/4TBK-6AFM]. 
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be viewed as a necessary consideration to maintain confidence in the bar, if 
not democracy.  Such a rule hinges on whether an impeachment trial is 
judicial or partially judicial in nature as to render the duty of impartiality 
mandatory to all attorneys.  As argued in this Article, all impeachment trials 
are sufficiently judicial in nature because a judge or justice administers an 
oath of impartiality before an impeachment trial commences. 
This Article is divided into two sections.  Section I is comprised of three 
parts which analyze the nature of both attorney oaths and juror oaths.  It 
then expands on the “lore of the profession” standard as a basis for 
justifying a rule for attorney conduct in legislative-judicial proceedings.  
Section II provides three historic examples of contemporaneously 
publicized state impeachment trials to support the proposition that 
legislative trials have long been sufficiently judicial in nature for modern 
state supreme courts to independently adopt an ethics rule as suggested 
above.  The first example is the 1871 impeachment trial of North Carolina’s 
governor, William Woods Holden.  This trial arose from Holden’s attempts 
to ensure universal male suffrage in compliance with the Fifteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.  Next, the section describes 
the 1913 impeachment trial of New York’s governor, William Sulzer, for 
fraud.  Sulzer took office less than a month before facing impeachment.  
Finally, the section presents the 1917 impeachment trial of Texas 
Governor James Ferguson, along with a Texas Supreme Court decision 
unequivocally characterizing impeachment trials as judicial in nature. 
Before proceeding, it is appropriate to note that elected officials, like 
judges, are subject to attorney discipline, but, unlike sitting judges,  
disciplined legislators and members of the executive branch may continue 
to serve in office even if disbarred.16  Disbarment of elected officials has 
stood for the proposition that individuals in positions of political power are 
accountable for failing to uphold basic standards of integrity.  A few 
examples demonstrate this proposition.  First, in 1974, the Maryland Court 
of Appeals upheld the state bar disciplinary committee’s decision to disbar 
 
16. See In re Troisi, 504 S.E.2d 625, 630 & n.6, 634–35 (W. Va. 1998) (holding state lawyer 
disciplinary proceedings had no jurisdiction to discipline a judge who physically confronted a litigant 
until state formal judicial discipline processes removed the judge from the bench); Off. of Disciplinary 
Couns. v. Anonymous Att’y A, 595 A.2d 42, 42 (Pa. 1991) (footnote omitted) (“[T]he Judicial Inquiry 
and Review Board (JIRB) has exclusive jurisdiction to discipline Judicial officers for misconduct[.]”); 
cf. Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 136–37 (1966) (deciding state legislators retained their positions in the 
face of unpopular conduct). 
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former Vice President and state Governor, Spiro Agnew.17  Agnew resigned 
from office prior to disbarment and pled nolo contendere to the crime of willful 
tax evasion in federal court.18  He then unsuccessfully argued disbarment 
for the crime of tax evasion would be unduly harsh and suspension would 
be more appropriate.19  Also, in 1976, the First Appellate Department of 
the Appellate Division of New York disbarred former President Richard 
M. Nixon.20  Finally, following President William Clinton’s impeachment, 
the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the state disciplinary committee’s 
recommendation to disbar him.21 
The ethics rule proposed above recognizes there are fifty state 
constitutions and a U.S. Constitution, and therefore, fifty-one versions of 
impeachment trials.  All fifty state constitutions contain articles related to 
the removal of state officers through impeachment, but there may be 
variances within each system.  Unlike the U.S. Constitution, many state 
constitutions also enable removal from office through the popular vote 
recall provision.22  However, in Kinsella v. Jaekle,23 the Connecticut Supreme 
Court noted that “the power of impeachment under the state constitution 
must also be exercised in a manner consistent with the requirements of the 
federal [C]onstitution.”24  Thus, this Article analyzes both federal and state 
appellate court decisions to not only evidence a universality of standards but 
also the need for a universal rule. 
 
17. Md. State Bar Ass’n v. Agnew, 318 A.2d 811, 817 (Md. 1974). 
18. Id. at 811–12. 
19. Id. at 813–814 (noting Spiro Agnew admitted to the crime of tax evasion but also argued 
disbarment was unduly harsh and suspension was a more reasonable punishment).   
20. In re Nixon, 385 N.Y.S.2d 305, 307 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976). 
21. Don van Natta, Jr., Panel Advises That Clinton Be Disbarred, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2000), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2000/05/23/us/panel-advises-that-clinton-be-disbarred.html [https:// 
perma.cc/Z85P-8ZSD]; President Would Drop High Court Privilege, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 2001, at A3.  
22. For examples of recall actions filed in the states, see generally In re Proposed Recall Petition 
to Request the Recall of Walz, No. A20-0984 (Minn. Aug. 13, 2020); In re Boldt, 386 P.3d 1104 (Wash. 
2017); Spence v. Terry, 340 N.W.2d 884 (Neb. 1983).  See also Vikram David Amar, Adventures in Direct 
Democracy: The Top Ten Constitutional Lessons from the California Recall Experience, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 927, 
927 (2004) (discussing the successful recall vote of former California Governor Gray Davis). 
23. Kinsella v. Jaekle, 475 A.2d 243 (Conn. 1984). 
24. Id. at 255. 
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I.    THE NATURE OF THE JUROR OATH AND ATTORNEY ETHICS 
In 1982, in Smith v. Phillips,25 the Court examined a relationship between 
juror bias and the taking of an oath.26  Smith arose from a New York state 
murder conviction in which a juror, during the course of the trial, applied 
for an investigator position with the district attorney whose subordinates 
were prosecuting the case.27  The Court noted that while the appeal arose 
through the stricter habeas standard for state conviction appeals, the remedy 
for state and federal convictions appeals raising claims of juror bias generally 
should result in a post-trial hearing, not an inelastic rule requiring reversal 
of a verdict.28  Nonetheless, the Court stated the prosecution’s failure to 
disclose the juror’s conduct did not deprive the respondent of his right to a 
fair trial.29 
Smith was not the Court’s last word on investigating juror bias.  In 2016, 
the Court, in Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado,30 held the jury’s deliberative 
processes are not sacrosanct to the point of precluding judicial review when 
there is evidence of juror bias in terms of race or another protected class.31  
Claims of juror prejudice now enable a post-conviction hearing in which a 
judge may inquire into the conduct of jurors during deliberations.32   
As a general rule, there is no judicial appeal from an impeachment trial, 
so the only means of ensuring proper legislative conduct are political—or 
more precisely electoral—in nature.  This is because in 1993, in Nixon v. 
United States,33 the Court determined the Constitution foreclosed appellate 
review of federal impeachment trials.34  Thus, any discussion of the 
proposed rule must consider the nature of juror oaths, attorney oaths, and 
the broader question of attorney ethics precisely because the enforcement 
of attorney ethics may be the only means of ensuring compliance with a 
juror oath in an impeachment trial. 
 
25. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982). 
26. See id. at 217 n.7 (examining the importance of a juror’s oath when examining a juror’s 
testimony for bias). 
27. Id. at 210–12.  
28. Id. at 214–16. 
29. Id. at 221. 
30. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 580 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017). 
31. Cf. id. at 866, 869 (deciding the Court could further inquire into jury deliberations when a 
juror clearly indicates he relied on racial animus or stereotypes in convicting a criminal defendant). 
32. See id. at 858 (holding the trial court may consider evidence of a juror’s statement if a juror 
clearly indicates the jury convicted the criminal defendant after relying on racial animus or stereotypes).  
33. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993). 
34. Id. at 226. 
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A. The Juror Oath 
A juror’s oath to impartially assess the evidence and not determine a 
verdict until a judge sends the jury into deliberations is a fundamental part 
of trials in the United States.35  Moreover, this oath, whether in the 
preselection process or after empanelment, is a signatory statement of a 
juror’s promise to be impartial and not render a judgment until all of the 
evidence and arguments have been presented.36  In United States v. 
Turrietta,37 the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
presented a helpful analysis for discerning the intersection of juror oaths 
and attorney ethics.38  Turrietta arose from a federal conviction issued by an 
unsworn jury, in which the defense counsel realized the federal judge had 
empaneled the jury without swearing the jury to an oath.39  The defense 
counsel intentionally withheld objection until the jury issued their verdict.40  
The Tenth Circuit determined the defense counsel’s failure to object 
compounded the error of an unsworn jury in the proceeding.41  Although 
the Tenth Circuit did not find the judge’s failure to swear the jury abridged 
Turrietta’s constitutional rights and placed much of the blame on Turrietta’s 
defense counsel, they reaffirmed that juror oaths are historically and 
 
35. For commentary on the importance of juror oaths, see People v. Cooper, 809 P.2d 865, 903 
(Cal. 1991) (“When a person violates his oath as a juror, doubt is cast on that . . . person’s ability to 
otherwise perform his duties.”); Redish v. State, 525 So. 2d 928, 930 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (citing 
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1985)) (indicating the prosecution should not try to influence 
the jury by evoking the jurors’ oath); Culpepper v. State, 209 S.E.2d 18, 18 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974) (“Trial 
court’s failure to swear jury to try prosecution for possession of marijuana constituted reversible 
error.”); State v. Martin, 255 N.W.2d 844, 846 (Neb. 1977) (stating it is essential that a jury be sworn 
for proceedings in a criminal case to be valid); People v. Bestle, 197 N.Y.S.2d 820, 823 (Herkimer Cnty. 
Ct. 1960) (indicating the trial court should have declared a mistrial upon realizing the jury had not been 
sworn); Howard v. State, 192 S.W. 770, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1912) (“[T]he jury must be sworn in the 
particular case as prescribed by the statute.”).  But see People v. Morales, 570 N.Y.S.2d 831, 833 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1991) (refusing to follow Bestle); Commonwealth ex rel. Tate v. Banmiller, 143 A.2d 56, 56 
(Pa. 1958) (permitting jurors to be sworn individually instead of as a body). 
36. For commentary on juror impartiality, see State v. Vogh, 41 P.3d 421, 428 (Or. Ct. App. 
2002) (citing State v. Barone, 986 P.2d 5, 17 (Or. 1999)) (indicating a jury’s oath is significant in 
ensuring a defendant receives a fair trial by an impartial jury); Dyson v. State, 722 So. 2d 782, 785 (Ala. 
Crim. App. 1997) (“The failure to administer the oath to the jury renders the jury’s verdict a nullity.”); 
State v. Block, 489 N.W.2d 715, 715 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (stating a “juror’s oath is an integral element” 
of a defendant’s constitutional right to have his guilt determined by an impartial jury). 
37. United States v. Turrietta, 696 F.3d 972 (10th Cir. 2012). 
38. See generally id. (explaining the limits of a court to nullify a guilty verdict when defendant’s 
counsel strategically withholds an objection to the failure of the trial court to swear in the jury). 
39. Id. at 974–75. 
40. Id. at 976. 
41. Id. 
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contemporaneously important to the concept of a fair trial.42  In essence, 
there was no evidence in Turrietta of juror misconduct, but the case indicates 
there is an onus on counsel to ensure jurors are sworn to an oath, thereby 
making it less likely misconduct will occur. 
In 2008, the Maryland Court of Appeals, in Harris v. State,43 determined 
an unsworn jury constituted a fundamental defect in a criminal trial, and 
unlike in Turrietta, the conduct of defense counsel in failing to object was 
not a factor in deciding to overturn the defendant’s conviction for vehicular 
manslaughter.44  Maryland’s justices held the oath of impartiality is a 
fundamental part of lawfully constituted trial.45  However, the importance 
of the juror oath is not a new concept.  In 1920, the Mississippi Supreme 
Court issued a decision similar to Harris in which that court, upon reversing 
a verdict, determined a jury’s failure to undertake an oath rendered them 
“little more than mere spectators.”46   
There should be little doubt that a juror who intentionally violates his or 
her oath is liable for criminal prosecution.  For example, in State v. 
Sammons,47 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals determined that when a citizen 
performs jury service after taking an oath, the juror becomes a public official 
under the law for the duration of a trial.48  In this way, a juror oath and juror 
misconduct are functionally related. 
Further demonstrating these concepts, in the 2008 case of People v. 
Hoffler,49 the New York Appellate Division determined that the failure to 
give a proper oath to be qualified as an impartial juror prior to voir dire 
constituted a fundamental defect to the fairness of the superseding trial.50  
Citing State v. Saybolt,51 a 1990 Minnesota Court of Appeals decision, 
 
42. See id. at 979–80, 985 (“The oath has been integral to the factfinding process since ancient 
times, and there is no disputing Turrietta’s assertion that it was an accepted feature of a properly 
constituted jury at common law . . . .  Given that the oath predated the development of the modern 
jury system, it is difficult to imagine the jury gaining legitimacy as a factfinding body without a swearing 
requirement.”). 
43. Harris v. State, 956 A.2d 204 (Md. 2008). 
44. See id. at 204, 207, 212 (holding, despite the timely objection issue, a sworn jury is a 
fundamental right of defendants in criminal trials). 
45. See id. at 211 (citing State v. Barone, 986 P.2d 5, 17 (Or. 1999)) (stating the tribunal is not 
lawfully constituted if jurors do not take the oath).   
46. Miller v. State, 84 So. 161, 161–62 (Miss. 1920). 
47. State v. Sammons, 417 N.W.2d 190 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987). 
48. Id. at 191.   
49. People v. Hoffler, 860 N.Y.S.2d 266 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008). 
50. Id. at 271. 
51. State v. Saybolt, 461 N.W.2d 729 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). 
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New York’s appellate judges noted a juror oath is more than a formality.52  
However, New York’s judges missed an important point raised by the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals.  In Saybolt, Minnesota’s judges determined the 
oath is also emblematic of a “duty to act in accordance with the law at all 
stages of trial.”53   
Finally, as the New Jersey Superior Court notes, a juror’s oath is also a 
key component of assuring the integrity of a grand jury proceeding, which 
is often considered to have a hybrid executive-judicial function.54  As a 
result, when one or more members of a grand jury are unable to uphold 
their oath, the grand jury may be considered void.55 
B. Attorney Oath 
The attorney oath reflects more than entry into the profession of law; it 
symbolizes that an attorney, according to the Maryland Court of Appeals in 
1973, “embraces moral standards that are more stringent than those 
applicable to others.”56  Likewise, the Minnesota Supreme Court stressed 
the importance of the attorney oath and the charge to protect the judicial 
process.57  In 2002, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed that a district 
attorney who uses deception in the performance of his or her duties fails to 
uphold the oath of being a “guardian[] of the law,” while “play[ing] a vital 
role in the preservation of society.”58  In 2011, the Florida Supreme Court 
revised Florida’s oath of admission to require new entrants to swear to 
civility and fairness in dealing with opposing counsel, their clients, and 
 
52. Hoffler, 860 N.Y.S.2d at 271 (citing Saybolt, 461 N.W.2d at 737).  The court goes on to 
further discuss the impossibility of quantifying the error of not swearing a jury under the harmless error 
doctrine because one cannot know how a jury would have assessed the evidence if the jury was not 
placed under oath.  Id. at 272.  
53. Saybolt, 461 N.W.2d at 737 (quoting People v. Pribble, 249 N.W.2d 363, 366 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1976)). 
54. See In re Monday Grand Jury Panel of Monmouth Cnty. Vicinage 9, 963 A.2d 388, 391 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 2008) (citing United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992)) (recognizing a 
grand jury is a buffer between the government and the people and it is the judge’s responsibility to call 
a grand jury together and administer their oath). 
55. See id. at 395 (referencing jurors who responded during voir dire that they were tainted by 
news stories and could not uphold their oaths as grand jurors and later finding the matters heard by 
the grand jury panel were void).  
56. Bar Ass’n v. Marshall, 307 A.2d 677, 682 (Md. 1973). 
57. O’Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 1979). 
58. See In re Pautler, 47 P.3d 1175, 1176, 1178 (Colo. 2002) (indicating an attorney who engages 
in purposeful deception violates his high ethical and moral duty as an attorney).   
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witnesses.59  Perhaps the South Carolina Supreme Court articulated the 
importance of adhering to the attorney oath most poignantly, declaring 
when an attorney “engage[s] in conduct tending to pollute the 
administration of justice . . . [the attorney] demonstrate[s] an unfitness to 
practice law.”60  
The Delaware Supreme Court provides a usable example of the 
enforcement of the attorney oath in In re Favata.61  The justices reaffirmed 
the principle that an attorney is an officer of the court and is thus expected 
to show honesty and an adherence to standards essential to maintaining fair 
trials.62  Favata, a prosecuting attorney employed by the state, had made 
false statements to a tribunal and was disruptive during a capital murder 
trial.63  Notably, he disparaged defense witnesses and used a “mafia” term 
that had a tendency to chill their testimony.64  In part because Favata was 
found to have “engaged in conduct . . . prejudicial to the administration of 
justice,” the court determined a suspension from the practice of law was the 
only appropriate remedy.65 
The following examples present situations indicating state bars often 
believe elected officials who hold law licenses must also adhere to the 
attorney oath.  For instance, following Senator Harrison A. Williams’s 
(D-NJ) federal conviction arising out his involvement in the ABSCAM 
scandal, the New Jersey Supreme Court disbarred him in 1982.66  In 1994, 
 
59. In re the Florida Bar, 73 So. 3d 149, 150 (Fla. 2011). 
60. See In re Hall, 509 S.E.2d 266, 268 (S.C. 1998) (referring to the attorney-respondent’s 
conduct in this case). 
61. See generally In re Favata, 119 A.3d 1283 (Del. 2015) (providing a good overview of the 
attorney oath). 
62. Id.; see also In re Favata, No. 2205 Disciplinary Docket No. 3, 2015 Pa. LEXIS 2540, at *1 
(Pa. 2015) (holding, as a matter of reciprocity, Favata was also suspended from practice within 
Pennsylvania for six months); Debra Cassens Weiss, Former Prosecutor is Suspended for Demeaning Remarks, 
False Denial About Snitch Threat, ABAJOURNAL (July 29, 2015, 7:49 AM), https://www.abajournal. 
com/news/article/former_prosecutor_is_suspended_for_demeaning_remarks_about_defendant_fal
se [https://perma.cc/AB3C-6MZN] (discussing the facts leading to Favata’s suspension from 
practice). 
63. In re Favata, 119 A.3d at 1284–85. 
64. See id. at 1286–88 (discussing the term “Omerta” is used as a mafia code of silence).  
65. See id. at 1291, 1293 (overturning the administrative board’s initial recommendation that a 
reprimand to Favata would serve the interests of justice). 
66. See generally In re Williams, 97 N.J. 712 (N.J. 1984); In re Williams, 88 N.J. 652 (N.J. 1982); 
Joseph F. Sullivan, Kean Said to Pick Businessman for Senate Seat Held by Williams, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 
1982), https://www.nytimes.com/1982/04/09/nyregion/kean-said-to-pick-businessman-for-senate-
seat-held-by-williams.html [https://perma.cc/Q2UC-PRVB]; Bennett L. Gershman, Abscam, the 
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the Kentucky Supreme Court upheld the suspension of Congressman 
Carroll Hubbard’s (D-KY) bar license after it was determined he had 
obstructed a Federal Election Commission investigation.67  In 1995, the 
Florida Supreme Court suspended Congressman Lawrence J. Smith (D-FL) 
after he was found guilty of federal income tax evasion and giving false 
statements to the Federal Election Commission.68  One year later, the 
Georgia Supreme Court disbarred former Representative Patrick Swindall 
(R-GA) after he had been convicted in federal court for committing perjury 
before a grand jury.69 
C. Lore of the Profession 
In 1985, the United States Supreme Court recognized, in In re Snyder,70 
the concept of “the lore of the profession,” often “embodied in codes of 
professional conduct” had a direct application to the practice of law.71  In 
this decision, authored by Chief Justice Warren Burger, the Court reinstated 
an attorney whom the Chief Judge of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
suspended from practice.72  The attorney, Robert Snyder, whom the United 
States District Court for the District of North Dakota had appointed to 
represent indigent defendants, challenged the appellate court’s reduction in 
his repayment invoice.73  On April 13, 1984, the appellate court determined 
Snyder’s complaint regarding repayment was “totally disrespectful to the 
federal courts and to the judicial system,” and “his refusal to demonstrate a 
sincere retraction of his admittedly ‘harsh’ statements [were] sufficient to 
 
Judiciary, and the Ethics of Entrapment, 91 YALE L.J. 1565, 1571–73 (1982) (discussing the ABSCAM 
scandal, an FBI sting operation that led to the conviction of many highly-placed individuals). 
67. See generally Hubbard v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 878 S.W.2d 13 (Ky. 1994) (holding Hubbard’s guilty 
plea to conspiracy to impede the Federal Election Commission, obstruction of justice, and theft of 
government property warranted his resignation and disbarment).  See Hubbard v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 
66 S.W.3d 684, 685 (Ky. 2001) (reinstating Carroll Hubbard to the Kentucky bar in 2001 following the 
recommendation of the Character and Fitness Committee). 
68. See generally Fla. Bar v. Smith, 650 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 1995) (holding Smith’s conviction 
warranted a three-year suspension). 
69. See generally In re Swindall, 468 S.E.2d 372 (Ga. 1996) (holding Swindall’s convictions for 
perjury warranted his disbarment). 
70. In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634 (1985). 
71. Id. at 645. 
72. See generally id. (discussing the Eighth Circuit’s denial of an en banc hearing for reinstatement, 
which resulted in the court not considering Mr. Snyder’s motion to have Chief Judge Donald P. Lay 
recused from taking part in the matter since he had previously ordered Snyder to apologize to the 
court); see also Matter of Snyder, 734 F.2d 334, 341 (providing additional background in the Snyder case). 
73. In re Snyder, 472 U.S. at 636. 
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demonstrate to th[e] court that he [was] not . . . fit to practice law in the 
federal courts.”74  In a unanimous decision, with Justice Harry Blackmun 
not participating, the Court determined Snyder’s objections to the limited 
payment of expenses was, in fact, disrespectful to the judiciary, and that 
federal courts had long possessed the power to disbar attorneys.75  
However, because Snyder’s objections to the recoupment of expenses, even 
in the view of the appellate court, possessed a degree of merit, and because 
a single rude letter in that context did not support the suspension from 
practice, it was therefore unmerited.76  It is noteworthy that the Ohio State 
Bar Association and several of the largest law firms in Bismarck sided with 
Snyder.77  In essence, Snyder’s adherence to the demands of being defense 
counsel upheld the lore of the profession and protected his position in the 
legal profession. 
Justice Burger’s mention of “the lore of the profession” in the Snyder case 
provides a critical delineation of a lawyer’s duty to the law.78  That is, a 
lawyer must act with regard to how his or her conduct may affect the 
reputation of the law.79  Courts have upheld the term “lore of the 
profession” as a standard of mandatory deportment against objections that 
the term is unconstitutionally vague.80  A lawyer who encourages a client to 
 
74. Id. at 637, 641 (emphasis omitted).  The Eighth Circuit’s opinion also stated: “All courts 
depend on the highest level of integrity and respect not only from the judiciary but from the lawyers 
who serve in the court as well.  Without public display of respect for the judicial branch of government 
as an institution by lawyers, the law cannot survive. . . .”  Id. at 641. 
75. Id. at 642–43, 647 (“All persons involved in the judicial process—judges, litigants, witnesses, 
and court officers—owe a duty of courtesy to all other participants.”). 
76. Id. at 646–47. 
77. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Court Reinstates Angry Lawyer, 33, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 1985), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1985/06/25/us/court-reinstates-angry-lawyer-33.html [https://perma. 
cc/7AZQ-VJFE] (indicating the Ohio State Bar Association supported Snyder by filing a brief on his 
behalf, and seven of Bismarck’s largest law firms joined to handle Snyder’s appeal to the Supreme 
Court free of charge). 
78. See In re Snyder, 472 U.S. at 645 (indicating “the lore of the profession” provides insight into 
actions that qualify as attorney misconduct). 
79. The Snyder opinion states: 
Read in light of the traditional duties imposed on an attorney, it is clear that “conduct unbecoming 
a member of the bar” is conduct contrary to professional standards that shows an unfitness to 
discharge continuing obligations to clients or the courts, or conduct inimical to the administration 
of justice. More specific guidance is provided by case law, applicable court rules, and “the lore of 
the profession,” as embodied in codes of professional conduct. 
Id. at 645. 
80. Cf. Howell v. State Bar of Tex., 843 F.2d. 205, 208 (5th Cir. 1988) (upholding a disciplinary 
scheme that drew meaning from court rules, case law, and the “lore of the profession”). 
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undertake an action so the lawyer can represent the client in a subsequent 
proceeding may violate the lore of the profession standard.  An attorney 
who repeatedly fails to file timely motions as set by a trial court violates the 
lore of the profession standard.81  The Connecticut Court of Appeals set a 
more pointed example of a violation of the standard in Chief Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Zelotes.82  That court determined an attorney who engaged in a 
sexual relationship with a married client and then encouraged the married 
client to obtain a divorce violated the lore of the profession standard.83   
A final example demonstrates how the lore of the profession holds 
attorneys to a higher behavioral standard.  In Attorney Grievance Commission v. 
Alison,84 the Maryland Court of Appeals determined that lawyer Stewart 
Alison committed misconduct by mistreating court personnel and abusing 
a private citizen he believed had been on a date with his estranged wife.85  
In another incident, Alison tried to effectuate a specious citizen’s arrest 
against his wife.86  Later, he got into an altercation with court deputies when 
he appeared on contempt charges.87  The appellate court, in upholding 
Alison’s suspension, conceded his language may have been within the First 
Amendment’s ambit, but attorneys were nonetheless held to a standard 
higher than other members of society.88  The state appellate court found, 
in essence, the requirement for attorneys to adhere to a higher standard is 
critical to the lore of the profession.89  As a postscript, in 1998 Alison was 
once more disbarred for filing frivolous lawsuits.90 
 
81. See, e.g., In re Kestenband, 366 F. App’x 305, 311 (2d Cir. 2010) (determining Kestenband’s 
failures to timely file motions constituted “neglect and lack of diligence” sufficient to justify a sanction). 
82. Chief Disciplinary Couns. v. Zelotes, 98 A.3d 852 (Conn. App. Ct. 2014). 
83. Id. at 384, 401. 
84. Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Alison, 565 A.2d 660 (Md. 1989). 
85. See id. at 661–64 (describing, first, an incident where Alison tried to stop a man named 
Emerick with his vehicle, ultimately resulting in his arrest, then describing incidents where Alison 
verbally abused court clerks).  
86. Id. at 661–62.  Other misconduct included attempting to have his wife prosecuted for 
forgery on scant evidence, harassment, and hindering a police officer.  Id. at 662–63. 
87. Id. at 663. 
88. See id. at 665–66 (commenting Alison’s speech, “ran afoul of the reasonable, necessary, and 
content-neutral restrictions imposed upon attorneys by the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct”).  
89. See id. at 666–67 (stating conduct like Alison’s “breeds disrespect for the courts and for the 
legal profession,” and urging respect and decorum are essential in the legal profession). 
90. Tanya Jones, Md. Court of Appeals Suspends the License of Bel Air Lawyer, BALT. SUN  
(May 21, 1998), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1998-05-21-1998141129-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/URR8-7KDZ].  See generally Michael Olesker, Trouble Seems to Just Follow Bel Air 
Lawyer, BALT. SUN (March 30, 1995), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1995-03-30-
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While a legislator who violates an oath to conduct fair and impartial 
justice in an impeachment trial does not have a specific client, the legislator-
lawyer’s pretrial promise of an acquittal may be said to have altered the 
lawyer’s duty to the “lore of the profession,” similar to the above examples.  
II.    HISTORIC IMPEACHMENT TRIALS 
Whether a state bar’s authorities should review violations of attorney 
oaths in the impeachment trial process hinges, somewhat, on the history of 
impeachment trials in the United States.  The Connecticut legislature’s 
impeachment of Governor John G. Rowland in 2004 provides some 
guidance to assessing the judicial nature of legislative trials.91  On 
January 26, 2004, the Connecticut House of Representatives created the 
Select Committee of Inquiry which issued a subpoena to 
Governor Rowland in the course of its investigation into his conduct, but 
he objected to complying with the state legislature in a state district court.92  
The district court ruled against him and the Connecticut Supreme Court 
upheld the ruling.93  In doing so, the state supreme court reaffirmed the 
principles announced in the 1984 opinion, Kinsella v. Jaeckle,94 which held 
there are two avenues for a limited judicial review of impeachment 
proceedings and trials.95  The first avenue is for actions that fall outside of 
the legislature’s constitutional impeachment authority, and the second 
avenue is to determine whether “egregious and otherwise irreparable 
violations of state or federal constitutional guarantees [are] being or had 
been committed” by the legislature.96 
In Kinsella, which arose from the attempted impeachment of a trial 
judge,97 the Connecticut Supreme Court provided a useful, albeit brief, 
historical analysis of impeachment operating as a quasi-judicial function.98  
According to the state’s justices, in the seventeenth century, the British 
 
1995089092-story.html [https://perma.cc/UA35-LMDP] (describing incidents including another 
frivolous lawsuit Alison filed against an attorney in order to harass him). 
91. See generally Off. of the Governor v. Select Comm. of Inquiry, 858 A.2d 709 (Conn. 2004) 
(holding an impeachment proceeding may be subject to judicial review under certain circumstances).  
92. See id. at 714–16 (explaining the governor filed a suit seeking to quash the subpoena, which 
was then litigated through the courts). 
93. Id. at 712 n.1, 714–15. 
94. Kinsella v. Jaekle, 475 A.2d 243 (Conn. 1984). 
95. Off. of the Governor, 858 A.2d at 718–19 (citing Kinsella, 475 A.2d at 243). 
96. See supra note 95. 
97. Kinsella, 475 A.2d at 245. 
98. See id. at 249–53 (developing a timeline leading to modern impeachment trials). 
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Parliament became fearful of trends James I and Charles I exhibited toward 
monarchal absolutism.99  In response, Parliament determined the House of 
Commons could investigate malfeasance or corruption of cabinet 
ministers100 and bring any charges to the House of Lords.101  The House 
of Lords, in turn, became “a court for great men and great causes.”102  The 
Connecticut Supreme Court, in reviewing this history and its impact on the 
United States’ constitutional provision, concluded while “the 
[impeachment] process is obviously adjudicative, and the sanctions imposed 
inescapably penal, it is not a purely judicial function.”103  In essence, the 
state’s justices determined an impeachment trial is a legislative process 
serving a judicial function. 
In contrast to the Connecticut court, on March 9, 1988, the Arizona 
Supreme Court declined, in Mecham v. Gordon,104 to enjoin the state 
legislature’s upper house from convening a court of impeachment against 
Governor Evan Mecham.105  Article VIII of the Arizona constitution 
specifies an impeachment process similar to the United States 
Constitution.106  However, similar to several other state constitutions, 
Arizona’s constitution also enables citizens to recall public officers, which, 
in effect, permits a constituency-wide vote to remove an elected official 
from public office.107  While Mecham faced an impeachment trial, he also 
confronted a recall effort and a grand jury investigation into fraud 
 
99. Id. at 251 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 213–14 (Chitty 1842)). 
100. See supra note 99. 
101. Id. at 251 (citing 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 380 (3d ed. 
1922)). 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 252. 
104. Mecham v. Gordon, 751 P.2d 957 (Ariz. 1988). 
105. Id. at 958.  
106. The Arizona constitution gives the lower house (the Arizona House of Representatives) 
the “sole power of impeachment.”  The provision goes on to state: 
All impeachments shall be tried by the senate, and, when sitting for that purpose, the senators 
shall be upon oath or affirmation to do justice according to law and evidence, and shall be presided 
over by the chief justice of the supreme court.  Should the chief justice be on trial, or otherwise 
disqualified, the senate shall elect a judge of the supreme court to preside. 
ARIZ. CONST. art. VIII, pt. 2, § 1 (West, Westlaw through the Second Regular Session of the Fifty-
Fourth Legislature).  The Arizona constitution also specifies: “No person shall be convicted without a 
concurrence of two-thirds of the senators elected.”  Id. § 2. 
107. See generally id. pt. 1 (West, Westlaw through the First Regular Session of the Fifty-Fifth 
Legislature) (addressing the recall of public officers). 
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allegations.108  In seeking an injunction against the impeachment trial, 
Mecham argued the impeachment trial resulted in statewide publicity that 
would render the subsequent judicial trial bereft of due process.109  He also 
argued the impeachment trial could compel him to give testimony the 
prosecution could use against him in a criminal trial.110  Although the state’s 
high court ruled against Mecham, it issued a decision contextualizing an 
impeachment trial’s judicial nature.  The justices observed that 
“nomenclature aside, trial in the Senate is not the equivalent of a criminal 
trial within the judicial system.”111  In that light, Arizona’s justices 
determined an impeachment trial in the state senate was a “uniquely 
legislative and political function,” rather than a judicial one.112  Although 
Mecham appears to be apart from the historical norm, the Arizona Supreme 
Court did not entirely dismiss potential judicial intervention in the political 
process of state impeachment trials. 
A. North Carolina, 1870: The Impeachment of Governor William Holden 
In 1870, North Carolina’s governor, William W. Holden, was brought 
before the state’s high court of impeachment.113  In the words of an early 
scholar, Holden was not a traditional Reconstruction governor Southerners 
would have labelled a “carpetbagger.”114  He was born in North Carolina, 
owned a local newspaper, and had supported Democratic political 
theories.115  During the Civil War, he disclaimed secession and remained 
 
108. See Paula D. McClain, Arizona “High Noon”: The Recall and Impeachment of Evan Mecham, 
21 POL. SCI. & POL’Y 628, 628 (1988) (“Evan Mecham was the first governor in United States history 
to be confronted with a recall, impeachment and criminal indictment simultaneously.”); see also Arizona 
Governor Granted Delay of Grand Jury Inquiry Into Loan, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1987, at A16 (indicating a 
grand jury investigated Governor Mecham for failing to report a $350,000 loan he received that was 
potentially tied to gubernatorial appointments). 
109. Mecham, 751 P.2d at 959–60.  Compare Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362–63 (1966) 
(holding pretrial publicity could threaten a trial’s fairness), with Phx. Newspapers Inc. v. Jennings, 
490 P.2d 563, 566–67 (Ariz. 1971) (declining to apply Sheppard to preliminary hearings). 
110. Mecham, 751 P.2d at 959–60. 
111. Id. at 961 (emphasis in original). 
112. Id. at 962.  But see id. at 963 (stating constitutional rights “will be vindicated by the judicial 
system when and where necessary”). 
113. See generally Cortez A.M. Ewing, Two Reconstruction Impeachments, 15 N.C. HIST. REV. 204 
(1938) (discussing Governor Holden’s impeachment). 
114. Id. at 204. 
115. Id. at 204–05; see also William C. Harris, William Woods Holden: In Search of Vindication, 
59 N.C. HIST. REV. 354, 356–60 (1982) (describing how, after Fort Sumter, Holden declared his 
support for southern independence). 
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pro-Union.116  On May 29, 1865, President Andrew Johnson appointed 
Holden as the state’s governor, but in the fall of that year Holden was 
defeated in the state’s first post-Civil War election.117  Later, in 1868, 
Holden was elected as governor, but he offended white North Carolina 
citizens when he worked to ensure newly enfranchised Black citizens were 
able to participate in state government and by his efforts to protect their 
right to vote.118  After ordering the state’s militia to combat a rising Ku 
Klux Klan and resisting a judge’s order to produce over one hundred 
arrested Klansmen, the legislature adopted an impeachment resolution 
against Holden in December 1870.119  The general nature of the articles of 
impeachment had to do with Holden’s arresting the Klansmen without 
bringing them to trial.120  The lower house’s vote was explainable because 
in August 1870, the state’s elections were favorable to the Democrats, and 
Holden, a Republican, then faced a legislature more likely to remove him.121   
As an example of the national interest in the impeachment trial, the 
Chicago Tribune reported Holden had tried to “terrify the opposition that a 
political victory would be certain,” but the “people through the [s]tate 
generally resented the high-handed proceedings and elected a [l]egislature so 
overwhelmingly opposed to the [g]overnor that it [was] more than likely his 
impeachment [would] be followed by conviction and deposition.”122  In 
contrast, the Philadelphia Inquirer, disparagingly called the impeachment a 
“political diversion.”123  
  
 
116. Ewing, supra note 113, at 205–06 (noting early in the war Governor Holden moved from 
supporting secession to seeking reunification with the North). 
117. See Harris, supra note 115, at 357–58 (“Diehard Confederates . . . seethed with resentment 
at Holden’s appointment.”).   
118. See Ewing, supra note 113, at 206 (recounting the struggle between the Union League, 
which worked to promote Black voting rights, and various organizations that opposed them); Jim D. 
Brisson, “Civil Government was Crumbling Around Me”: The Kirk-Holden War of 1870, 88 N.C. HIST. REV. 
123, 123 (2011) (indicating Holden aimed to guarantee Black rights during his tenure as governor). 
119. Ewing, supra note 113, at 207–12.  In March of 1870, Holden declared Alamance County 
was in a state of insurrection and declared martial law.  Ewing, supra note 113, at 208–09. 
120. See Brisson, supra note 118, at 157–58 (describing the articles of impeachment against 
Governor Holden).  
121. See id. at 157–58 (discussing how, after the midterm elections, Conservatives hastily 
initiated impeachment proceedings against Holden); Harris, supra note 115, at 360 (noting when the 
conservative Democrats swept into office, they immediately called for Holden’s impeachment and 
removal); Ewing, supra note 113, at 210–211 (describing how the August 1870 election resulted in a 
decisive Democratic win). 
122. Impeachment of Governor Holden, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 29, 1870. 
123. Political Complications, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 13, 1870, at 4. 
  
2021] Sufficiently Judicial 479 
On December 23, the state legislature’s upper house organized into a 
“court of impeachment,” and the state’s Chief Justice Pearson, became its 
presiding officer.124  Justice Pearson administered an oath requiring the 
senators to impartially assess the evidence before rendering a decision.125  
He then ruled on a motion to grant Holden a delay to prepare a defense 
against the impeachment articles.126  The senate trial included Holden’s 
son-in-law, who had been elected to the state senate, and the remaining so-
called “carpetbag[ger]” senators serving as jurors.127  However, elected 
Democratic party legislators, who vehemently opposed racial equality, 
comprised the majority of the senate.128  For nearly three months, the 
Senate heard testimony and determined the large numbers of murders 
committed by the Klan, including a fellow state senator’s execution, did not 
justify Holden’s declaration of martial law.129  Pearson determined it was 
improper to rule on motions, but he advised on the admissibility of 
documents to prove Holden’s alleged “animus” and his motive in declaring 
martial law.130  Pearson’s ruling granting a delay and providing legal 
guidance to the state legislature while it sat as a jury evidences the judicial 
nature of an impeachment trial. 
 
124. Ewing, supra note 113, at 215. 
125. See 1 TRIAL OF WILLIAM W. HOLDEN, GOVERNOR OF NORTH CAROLINA, BEFORE THE 
SENATE OF NORTH CAROLINA ON IMPEACHMENT BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR HIGH 
CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 21, 25 (1871) [hereinafter 1 TRIAL OF WILLIAM W. HOLDEN] 
(providing names of the senators sworn and the oath used in the trial).  The oath taken read: “I __ 
swear truly and impartially to try and determine the charges in the Articles of Impeachment exhibited 
against William W. Holden, Governor of the State of North Carolina, under the Constitution and laws 
thereof according to the evidence: So help me God.”  Id. at 25. 
126. Id. at 23–24. 
127. Ewing, supra note 113, at 221.  Ewing noted: “Criticism is sometimes offered against 
permitting relatives and other close friends of the respondent to act as members of the impeachment 
court, but eligibility to sit in the [S]enate automatically entitles one to a place on the court.”  Id. 
128. See ERIC ANDERSON, RACE AND POLITICS IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1872–1901: THE 
BLACK SECOND 3 (1981) (indicating the Democratic party supported the Ku Klux Klan and 
impeached Governor Holden for his opposing the Klan); DEBORAH BECKEL, RADICAL REFORM: 
INTERRACIAL POLITICS IN POST-EMANCIPATION NORTH CAROLINA 76 (2011) (“[The] Conservative 
Party . . . did not have the two-thirds majority in the senate” required to impeach Governor Holden, 
but the party gained the majority upon “disput[ing] the elections of several Republican senators”). 
129. BECKEL, supra note 128, at 72–73, 76–77 (describing Klansmen’s vicious attacks, including 
the murder of Senator John W. Stephens, and how Governor Holden was impeached for his 
declaration of martial law and opposition to the Ku Klux Klan). 
130. See 1 TRIAL OF WILLIAM W. HOLDEN, supra note 125, at 158–60, 256 (describing how 
Chief Justice Pearson allowed the admittance of evidence to prove Governor Holden’s motives).   
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B. New York, 1913: The Impeachment of William Sulzer 
In 1913, New York’s legislative branch, with nine of the state’s court of 
appeals judges participating, removed Governor William Sulzer through 
New York’s constitutional impeachment procedures.131 Almost 
contemporaneously, a University of Virginia Law Review author observed 
Sulzer’s impeachment trial was “one of the greatest trials in our country’s 
history” and it “exceeded in importance and interest that of Justice Chase 
and closely rivaled that of President Johnson.”132   
The 1777 New York constitution established an impeachment process in 
which the assembly—the state legislature’s lower house—possessed the 
power of impeachment.133  If the legislature forwarded one or more articles 
of impeachment to the state senate, the senators, along with the state’s 
supreme court judges, would sit on a court of impeachment.134  The original 
state constitution was replaced in 1821, and again in 1846,135 but the newer 
constitutions did not appear to greatly alter the trial procedure—the main 
modification to the impeachment process included removing the terms “mal 
and corrupt,” and “high crimes and misdemeanors” as the bases for 
impeachment.136  The newer constitutions also only required the lower 
 
131. See Stuart G. Gibboney, Some Legal Aspects of the Impeachment of William Sulzer, 1 VA. L. REV. 
102, 105 (1913) (indicating nine members of the court of appeals—which consisted of three judges 
from the New York Supreme Court sitting as a part of that court—participated in the court of 
impeachment); John R. Dunne & Michael A.L. Balboni, New York’s Impeachment Law and the Trial of 
Governor Sulzer: A Case for Reform, 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 567, 567, 581 (1986) (indicating, though the 
New York constitution included an impeachment standard, at the time of Governor Sulzer’s 
impeachment in 1913 the standard was unclear and imprecise, which resulted in the New York 
legislature exhibiting broad impeachment powers). 
132. Gibboney, supra note 131, at 102.  One of the major issues raised during the impeachment, 
not addressed in this Article, is that Sulzer argued the state impeachment provision only applied to 
misconduct occurring while in office, and he was charged with misconduct that occurred prior to the 
gubernatorial inauguration.  Id. at 105. 
133. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXIII.  The assembly and senate together form the New York 
state legislature.  Id. art. II.  
134. Id.. art. XXXII.  There were actually two courts convened under article XXXII, but they 
appear to be duplicative.  One court convened for the actual trial, and a second court—comprised of 
the members of the first court—served as a court of errors.  Id. 
135. See Dunne & Balboni, supra note 131, at 580 (describing the constitutional standards used 
in the 1821 and 1846 constitutions).  
136. See id. at 577–78, 577 n.92, 581 (stating the delegates at the New York Constitutional 
Convention of 1846 removed “the ‘mal and corrupt’ and ‘high crimes and misdemeanors’ language 
from the constitution,” which led to an “absence of a clear and precise constitutional standard defining 
impeachable acts” during the impeachment of Governor Sulzer).  
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house to vote by a simple majority to forward an article of impeachment to 
the state senate.137  
Sulzer was first elected to the New York Assembly in 1889, and four years 
later rose to become speaker of the state’s lower house.138  In 1894, New 
York’s Tenth Congressional District’s voters elected Sulzer to the house of 
representatives, and in 1910 he became the chairman of the New York 
House Foreign Relations Committee.139  Sulzer’s downfall is explainable by 
quickly reviewing New York’s political history.  In 1910, New York’s 
progressive Democrats gained the legislature and governor’s office in an 
election sweep, and it was the first time in sixteen years that a Democrat 
Party candidate, John Dix, became governor. 140  However, two years later 
Sulzer, with the support of progressives including President Woodrow 
Wilson and New York’s Tammany Hall machine, replaced Dix as the party’s 
gubernatorial candidate in an intraparty fight.141  Dix’s supporters were 
angry at his intraparty replacement, and state Republicans were willing to 
ally with Dix to remove Sulzer.142 
Shortly after the 1912 election, the legislature discovered Sulzer violated 
state law by failing to report thousands in political contributions.143  
Moreover, there was evidence that some of the monies collected to finance 
Sulzer’s campaign went into his personal account and into a secret trust fund 
account with a brokerage firm.144  The New York Assembly impeached 
Sulzer by a vote of seventy-nine to forty-five.145  In October 1913, the New 
York Senate, while serving as a court of impeachment, found Sulzer guilty 
 
137. See id. at 576 (indicating the constitution of 1821 reduced voting requirements to impeach 
a public official from two-thirds majority to a simple majority vote of the assembly). 
138. Robert F. Wesser, The Impeachment of a Governor: William Sulzer and the Politics of Excess, 
60 N.Y. HIST. 407, 409 (1979). 
139. Id.  
140. DAVID R. BERMAN, GOVERNORS AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT 163 (2019). 
141. Id.; see MATTHEW L. LIFFLANDER, THE IMPEACHMENT OF GOVERNOR SULZER: A 
STORY OF AMERICAN POLITICS 117 (2012); Wesser, supra note 138, at 410–11 (describing how Sulzer 
gained President Wilson’s and Tammany Hall’s support, which helped him win the race for governor).  
142. Cf. Wesser, supra note 138, at 411 (“[T]he Democratic euphoria of 1912 could not mask 
the doubt and misgivings that many harbored toward Sulzer.”); id. at 414 (stating Sulzer’s campaign 
theme “was interpreted as an attack on the Tammany-dominated regime of . . . Dix”). 
143. Id. at 431. 
144. Id. 
145. Two Claim to Be Governor of New York State, S. BEND NEWS-TIMES, Aug. 14, 1913, at 1; see 
Jack O’Donnell, The Story of NY’s Only Gubernatorial Impeachment, CITY & STATE N.Y. (Mar. 3, 2021), 
https://www.cityandstateny.com/articles/opinion/commentary/story-nys-only-gubernatorial-impea 
chment.html [https://perma.cc/VZ7M-N3E9] (providing a breakdown of members of the Assembly 
who voted for and against impeachment). 
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under three impeachment articles regarding false statements on election 
finances, perjury in swearing his statements were accurate, and suppressing 
evidence.146  One of the major issues in the trial arose as a result of the 
continued service of several senators who initially investigated Sulzer and 
then sat in judgment of him.147  The presiding Judge Edgar Montgomery 
Cullen resolved the challenge in ruling “there is this marked distinction 
between a challenge to a juror and a challenge to a judge . . . .  At common 
law, nothing disqualifies a judge from sitting, except direct interest in the 
case.”148  In 1914, in People ex rel. Robin v. Hayes,149 the Supreme Court of 
New York, Appellate Division characterized the impeachment trial as partly 
judicial in deciding Sulzer had no power to issue a pardon after the assembly 
forwarded impeachment articles to the state senate.150  It is clear, then, that 
while the state impeachment trial process permitted senators and judges to 
serve regardless of party or prior activity, the impeachment trial process 
itself was considered judicial, rather than legislative. 
C. Texas, 1917: The Impeachment of James Ferguson 
In 1917, the Texas state senate conducted an impeachment trial against 
Governor James Ferguson.  When, in 1913, Ferguson entered the 
Democratic primary for the governorship, he was an almost unknown 
businessman with no prior political office.151  Elected governor in 1914, 
Ferguson had not advanced beyond the sixth-grade and employed 
Jeffersonianism- and Jefferson Davisism-style governance.152  The genesis 
of his impeachment began with Ferguson’s assertion of control over the 
University of Texas when he tried to secure the dismissal of six professors 
 
146. See, e.g., LIFFLANDER, supra note 141, at 305–08. 
147. 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT FOR THE TRIAL OF IMPEACHMENTS, THE PEOPLE OF 
THE STATE OF NEW YORK BY THE ASSEMBLY THEREOF AGAINST WILLIAM SULZER, AS GOVERNOR 
18 (J. B. Lyon Co. 1913). 
148. Id. at 44. 
149. People ex rel. Robin v. Hayes, 149 N.Y.S. 250 (N.Y. App. Div. 1914). 
150. See id. at 253–54 (indicating Sulzer’s powers and duties as governor passed from him to 
Martin H. Glynn at the moment the articles of impeachment were adopted). 
151. See Jessica Brannon-Wranosky & Bruce A. Glasrud, Introduction: James Edward “Farmer Jim” 
Ferguson’s Impeachment and Its Ramifications, in IMPEACHED: THE REMOVAL OF TEXAS 
GOVERNOR JAMES E. FERGUSON 1–2 (Jessica Brannon-Wranosky & Bruce A. Glasrud eds., 2017) 
(describing the unlikely success James E. Ferguson experienced in his run for the governorship). 
152. Cortez A.M. Ewing, The Impeachment of James E. Ferguson, 48 POL. SCI. Q. 184, 184–85 
(1933). 
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as well as the university president.153  As one scholar points out, Ferguson 
was an anti-prohibitionist, opposed women’s suffrage, and made enemies of 
progressives in the state, so the political fight over the dismissal of 
professors became a proxy for an alliance of legislators to seek 
impeachment.154  In February 1917, a state senator introduced a resolution 
calling for an investigation into Ferguson, but the legislature tabled the 
resolution.155 
In July 1917, a grand jury indicted Ferguson for embezzlement, 
misapplying public funds, and diverting public funds.156  On August 23, 
1917, the Texas House of Representatives voted eighty-one to fifty-two to 
impeach Ferguson157 and passed twenty-one articles to the Texas 
Senate.158  One of the articles arose from Ferguson’s refusal to explain the 
source of a $156,000 loan, and another article was a result of his 
appropriating over $5,000 for his personal use.159  The remaining articles 
alleged a combination of abuses of power as well as misappropriation of 
monies, though not all for personal gain.160  Ferguson demurred to the 
articles and specifically answered each one, denying the alleged facts and 
claiming he was not guilty of the alleged misconduct.161  The trial included 
the calling of witnesses as well as public rulings on objections by the senate 
 
153. See Frederic A. Ogg, Impeachment of Governor Ferguson, 12 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 106, 113 (1918) 
(describing Ferguson’s animosity toward the University of Texas faculty); John A. Lomax, Governor 
Ferguson and the University of Texas, 28 SW. REV. 11, 13 (1942) (naming the six professors discharged 
from the university and indicating Ferguson also demanded the discharge of the university president); 
Ewing, supra note 152, at 186 (“Ferguson demanded the dismissal of six faculty members.”). 
154. See Lewis L. Gould, The University Becomes Politicized: The War with Jim Ferguson, 1915–1918, 
86 SW. HIST. Q. 255, 260, 271 (1982) (reporting how Ferguson promised to veto prohibition legislation, 
but a group of prohibition and women’s suffrage supporters staged a coalition that was too powerful 
for Ferguson).  See generally John R. Lundberg, The Great Texas Bear Fight: Progressivism and the Impeachment 
of James E. Ferguson, in IMPEACHED: THE REMOVAL OF GOVERNOR JAMES E. FERGUSON, supra 
note 151 (chronicling Ferguson’s volatile history with the University of Texas and describing various 
Texas political factions which banded together to oppose and impeach Governor Ferguson). 
155. Ewing, supra note 152, at 187. 
156. Gov. Ferguson, Texas, Indicted on Nine Counts: Action by Grand Jury Follows Rumors of Impeachment, 
CHI. DAILY TRIB., July 28, 1917, at 1; Governor Ferguson of Texas Indicted: Impeachment Bill to Be Introduced 
Next Week—He Comes out for Third Term, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1917, at 9. 
157. Texas House Votes to Impeach Governor: Orders Committee to Draw Bill of Charges, and Executive 
May Leave Office Today, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1917, at 7. 
158. Governor of Texas Has Been Suspended; Impeachment Ordered: Board of House Managers Presents 21 
Articles to the Senate, Charging Official Misconduct to Ferguson, ATLANTA CONST., Aug. 25, 1917, at 1. 
159. Id.; Ewing, supra note 152, at 199–200. 
160. See Ewing, supra note 152, at 199–201 (describing the articles of impeachment). 
161. Id. at 201–02. 
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itself.162  One day before the senate entered its findings against Ferguson, 
he attempted to resign, but the trial concluded with the issuance of a guilty 
verdict against the governor, and an accompanying sentence prohibited him 
from holding any state political office again.163 
In 1924, the Texas Supreme Court heard an appeal from a voter’s lawsuit 
which challenged the placement of Ferguson’s name on a Democratic party 
primary ballot.164  Ferguson sought to be elected to the governor’s office 
once more in spite of the prohibition against his serving in public office.165  
Ferguson argued the verdict and sentence were unconstitutional because he 
had resigned prior to the Texas Senate issuing a verdict.166  Ferguson also 
claimed that because the legislature had to be called into a special session, it 
was not constitutional to investigate or prosecute him under the state 
constitution.167  Finally, he also argued the sentence was criminal in nature 
and therefore violated the state constitution because a court of law did not 
impose it.168  The Texas Supreme Court first noted the impeachment 
process in the state’s lower house operated akin to a grand jury, then 
characterized the impeachment trial as “clearly judicial as to make argument 
on the point almost superfluous.”169  In other words, the Texas Supreme 
Court specifically noted the impeachment court was judicial in nature. 
III.    CONCLUSION 
Although in egregious situations, such as the promise to disregard an 
oath, one can conclude an ethics norm has been already breached, there is a 
fundamental principle that attorney disciplinary rules, like criminal law, must 
not be vague and must place members of the bar on notice.  At the same 
time, no ethics rule should be designed to hamper a legislator in the 
performance of his or her duties, even when those duties include advocacy 
 
162. Id. at 202. 
163. Id. at 205–207. 
164. Ferguson v. Maddox, 263 S.W. 888, 888 (Tex. 1924). 
165. See id. at 888–89 (“The defendant Ferguson, after admitting his candidacy and his efforts 
and purpose to get his name placed upon the Democratic ticket, answered denying his alleged 
ineligibility, and averring that said judgment was and is void, and ineffectual to disqualify him . . . .”). 
166. Id. at 889. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at 890.  Shortly after, the court also noted that, on receipt of the impeachment articles, 
the state senate “under the mandate of the [c]onstitution, resolves itself into a court for the trial of the 
charges, and it may and must continue this trial until the matter is disposed of by final judgment.”  Id. 
at 891. 
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for unpopular or noxious causes.  Yet an impeachment trial is sufficiently 
judicial to merit a rule such as proposed above.  Such a rule, if enacted by 
the bar associations of each of the fifty states, will reinforce the sanctity of 
the judicial oath as well as the importance of the attorney oath.  Bar 
discipline against a legislator might be deemed a political weapon, but the 
proposed rule, as noted above, does not require a legislator to vote for 
specific outcome; nor does the rule require recusal based on party affiliation.  
The rule is designed to inform lawyers who become legislators that in the 
rare instance of an impeachment trial, the code of attorney ethics demands 
they comport to the expectations of behavior required of all attorneys.  In 
doing so, this rule will serve as a means against further erosion of respect 
for the law. 
 
